Estimating the European Central Bank's "Extended Period of Time" by Bletzinger, Tilman & Wieland, Volker
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TILMAN BLETZINGER, VOLKER WIELAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimating the European Central Bank’s 
“Extended Period of Time” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability 
GOETHE UNIVERSITY FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 74 (2013)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability 
Goethe University Frankfurt 
House of Finance 
Grüneburgplatz 1 
D-60323 Frankfurt am Main 
www.imfs-frankfurt.de  |  info@imfs-frankfurt.de 
    
1 
 
 
 
Estimating the European Central Bank’s 
 “Extended Period of Time”  
 
 
 
Tilman Bletzinger 
Volker Wieland
* 
 
Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability 
Goethe University Frankfurt 
 
 
September 4, 2013 
 
 
Abstract 
 
On July 4, 2013 the ECB Governing Council provided more specific forward guidance than in 
the past by stating that it expects ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for 
an extended period of time. As explained by ECB President Mario Draghi this expectation is 
based on the Council’s medium-term outlook for inflation conditional on economic activity 
and money and credit.  Draghi also stressed that there is no precise deadline for this extended 
period of time, but that a reasonable period can be estimated by extracting a reaction 
function. In this note, we use such a reaction function, namely the interest rate rule from 
Orphanides and Wieland (2013) that matches past ECB interest rate decisions quite well, to 
project the rate path consistent with inflation and growth forecasts from the survey of 
professional forecasters published by the ECB on August 8, 2013. This evaluation suggests an 
increase in ECB interest rates by May 2014 at the latest. We also use the Eurosystem staff 
projection from June 6, 2013 for comparison. While it would imply a longer period of low 
rates, it does not match past ECB decisions as well as the reaction function with SPF forecasts.  
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1. ECB Style Forward Guidance 
 
Following ECB Governing Council statements in May and June that the monetary policy stance will 
remain accommodative for as long as necessary, on July 4, 2013 the Council took the unprecedented 
step of stating its expectation for future interest rates more specifically as follows: 
 
“Looking ahead, our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative as long as necessary. 
The Governing Council expects the ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for 
an extended period of time. This expectation is based on the overall subdued outlook for 
inflation extending into the medium term, given the broad-based weakness in the real 
economy and subdued monetary dynamics.”  
 
By providing information on expected future policy decisions, policy makers remove some of the 
uncertainty faced by market participants, namely uncertainty about the policy makers’ own 
expectations. This type of forward guidance of market expectations is used more and more widely 
among central banks. Norges Bank and Sveriges Riskbank – the central banks of Norway and Sweden 
– belong to those that have moved furthest in this direction by regularly publishing their forecasts of 
policy rates together with their forecasts of inflation and economic activity.
1 They even add measures 
that reflect the likelihood of different policy paths depending on the uncertainty around the 
economic outlook.  
 
ECB President Mario Draghi has explained the ECB’s approach to forward guidance by revealing 
information on policymakers’ expectations in more detail in the press conferences on July 4 and 
August 1, 2013.
2  On August 1, for example, he stated: “our formulation of forward guidance is in line 
with our strategic framework, which is anchored in our assessment of the medium-term outlook for 
inflation, or price stability. And this outlook depends on economic activity and on money and credit 
developments. So this is our strategic framework, within which we can say that medium-term 
inflationary expectations remain firmly anchored.” 
 
Accordingly, the ECB statement on future policy rates is being conditioned on its macroeconomic 
outlook. This conditioning on the outlook is done in a way that is parallel to the ECB’s usual 
justification of the decision on current policy rates. It includes a review of the first pillar of the ECB’s 
strategy, its so-called economic analysis comprising the inflation and growth outlook, and the second 
pillar, its so-called monetary analysis or cross-checking with monetary and credit developments.  
Consequently, the anticipated policy rate path will change whenever policy makers’ expectations of 
future macroeconomic developments change. Thus, the ECB’s forward guidance does not necessarily 
stand in conflict with earlier ECB statements that the Governing Council does not pre-commit itself.  
 
The exact numerical expectation of the policy path and the length of time, for which the Governing 
Council anticipates policy rates to stay at current or lower levels, remain uncertain to market 
participants.  However, President Draghi has stressed that “there is no precise deadline for this 
extended period of time. As a matter of fact, you can … extract a reaction function and, from there, 
estimate what would be a reasonable extended period of time”. This is precisely the purpose of this 
note. We use a particular reaction function, namely the interest rate rule from Orphanides and 
Wieland (2013) that matches past ECB interest rate decisions quite well, to project the rate path 
consistent with the macroeconomic outlook.  
 
 
                                                           
1 See Norges Bank (2013) and Sveriges Riksbank (2013) for descriptions of their practice.  
2 Further information on the implementation of the ECB’s forward guidance and its motivation has been 
provided in a paper by Peter Praet, the Member of the Executive Board in charge of the Directorate General 
Economics (see Praet (2013)).   
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2. A possible reaction function to be used for estimating the ECB’s “extended period of time” 
 
The interest rate rule used by Orphanides and Wieland (2013) (OW) takes the following 
mathematical form: 
  
 
* *
1 3| 2| 2| 0.5( ) 0.5( ) t t t t t t t t i i q q π π − + + + = + − + − ,  (1) 
 
where i denotes the main policy rate set by the central bank. The rule assumes that the central bank 
changes the interest rate setting in response to deviations of the forecast for inflation from the 
central bank’s target rate for inflation and to deviations of the forecast for GDP growth from the 
estimated growth potential. π denotes the rate of inflation, π
* the inflation target set by the ECB, q 
the growth rate of GDP and q
* the growth rate of potential GDP. The time index t describes one 
quarter and t+3|t (t+2|t) is meant to denote the forecast of a certain variable 3 quarters (2 quarters) 
into the future. The reaction coefficients are set at 0.5 such that a one-percentage-point deviation of 
the inflation forecast from target or the output growth forecast from potential would result in a 50 
basis point adjustment of the policy rate.
3 
 
Despite its simplicity, this rule already incorporates two of the concerns mentioned by the ECB 
statement directly, namely the outlook for inflation and the outlook for economic activity. It does not 
include an explicit measure of monetary dynamics. However, such a rule could be extended to 
include ECB-style monetary cross-checking, for example, in form of the mathematical 
characterization developed in Beck and Wieland (2007, 2008).  
 
Ideally, one would want to feed ECB Governing Council members’ forecasts of inflation and output 
growth into the reaction function defined by the simple rule in equation (1).  Such an approach was 
taken by Orphanides and Wieland (2008) who estimated simple interest rate rules for the United 
States using information on the forecasts of members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
published for many years in the semi-annual Humphrey-Hawkins reports.
4 Given that President 
Draghi emphasized in the August press conference that the statement about future policy rates is an 
expectation by a very specific set policy makers,
5 it would be appropriate to follow the same 
approach here.  
 
Unfortunately, however, the inflation and output growth forecasts of ECB Governing Council 
members are not publicly available. Instead, Orphanides and Wieland (2012) use information from 
the survey of professional forecasters that is collected by the ECB and published in the second month 
of every quarter shortly after the policy meeting of that month. Specifically, they use not the yearly 
forecasts from that survey but rather the 4-quarters-ahead forecast from the most recent data point 
available.  The respective forecast horizons - from the quarter of the policy decision and publication 
of the SPF survey – correspond to t+3 quarters for CPI inflation and t+2 quarters for GDP growth, due 
to the different timing and frequency of CPI inflation and GDP growth data releases. Hence, the 
different timing of the forecast deviations in the rule in equation (1) is determined by the availability 
of data on forecasts.   
                                                           
3 Orphanides and Wieland (2013) show that a rule with these coefficients matches historical ECB rate decisions 
surprisingly well. They also investigate the optimal choice of such response coefficients as well as the forecast 
horizons by evaluation the stabilization performance of these rules in different macroeconomic models of the 
euro area. 
4 See also Wieland (2012) for an estimate of the likely date of lift-off of the federal funds rate in the United 
States.  
5 The complete quote of Draghi is “… it is more than a forecast. Allow me to point out that the statement says 
‘We expect’. It does not say ‘It is expected’ and it does not say ‘An international institution expects’; it says ‘We 
– the policy-makers – expect the key ECB interest rates to remain at the present or lower levels for an extended 
period of time’. So, it is an expectation by a very specific set of policy-makers.”   
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Furthermore, the relevant benchmarks in terms of inflation target and potential growth are not 
known with precision. The inflation objective of the ECB is defined as below but close to 2 percent. 
Therefore, OW use values of 1.5% and 2% to define a range of interest rate prescriptions that is 
consistent with the ECB’s inflation objective.  As to potential growth OW employ the estimate 
produced by the European Commission,
6 because the ECB does not publish its own estimates of 
potential growth in the euro area.  
 
Figure 1 compares the historical interest rate prescriptions from the OW rule to the ECB policy rate 
on its main refinancing operations (MRO Rate). The range of prescriptions spanned by the 1.5 
percent and 2 percent assumptions on the inflation objective matches the ECB’s interest rate 
decisions very well. It does so even though the rule does not include additional information on 
monetary dynamics. This result is consistent with the idea that cross-checking the ECB’s first pillar 
with longer-term trends in monetary and credit dynamics only leads to occasional adjustments in the 
policy stance, while short-run information on money and credit may also be accounted for in the 
outlook for GDP. 
 
 
Notes:  The black line shows the ECB’s interest rate on its main refinancing operations in the second month of each 
quarter from 1999:Q1 to 2013:Q3. The gray shaded area is constructed with the OW Rule: MRO rate = (previous MRO rate) 
+ 0.5(3-quarter ahead forecasted inflation deviation from target) + 0.5(2-quarter ahead forecasted GDP growth rate gap 
from potential). The lower line of the shaded area has an inflation target of 2 percent and the upper line a target of 1.5 
percent. The forecast data is from the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). 
 
 
 
3. Projecting the future interest rate path and estimating the ECB’s “extended period of time”  
 
In order to use the reaction function to project future prescriptions for the MRO rate one requires 
predictions of future forecasts. For example, to project the interest rate in 2013:Q4, the forecast of 
inflation between 2013:Q3 and 2014:Q3 based on 2013:Q4 information is needed.  As indicated by 
the law of iterated expectations this forecast is identical to the forecast of inflation between 2013:Q3 
and 2014:Q3 based on 2013:Q3 information.  Accordingly we construct the forecasts for inflation and 
output for the relevant horizon using the information from the SPF data published on the ECB 
website on August 8, 2013.  As the forecast horizon moves into the future, it is also necessary to 
interpolate available SPF forecasts. The detailed derivations can be found in the appendix to this 
note. 
                                                           
6 To obtain quarterly estimates OW interpolate the annual estimates from the annual macro-economic 
database (AMECO) of the European Commission. 
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Figure 1: MRO Rate versus Orphanides and Wieland (2013) Rule with SPF Forecasts 
 
 
Notes:  The black line shows the ECB’s interest rate 
quarter from 2012:Q1 to 2013:Q3. The gray dashed lines show 
quarter ahead forecasted inflation deviation from target) + 0.5(
potential). The lower gray line has an inflation target of 2.0 percent and the upper line a target of 1.5 percent. 
lines show the projected rate path implied by available inflat
ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
 
Figure 2 displays the resulting projection of the interest rate path with a 1.5% and a 2% inflation 
target (blue dashed lines). The lower projection (based on the 2% target) breaches 
setting of the MRO rate in the first quarter of 2014.  By the 
projected interest rate prescriptions has risen above the current MRO rate of 50 basis points. As the 
relevant timing of the MRO rate is the second month of the quarter, this projection implies that the 
ECB should anticipate raising its key interest rates at the latest by May 2014. 
the interest rate projections are provided in the appendix. 
 
 
 
4. What about using Eurosystem staff projections of inflation and growth instead of the SPF? 
 
It is certainly reasonable to think that Eurosystem staff forecasts of inflation and GDP growth 
constitute a better measure for approximating the expectations of ECB Governing Council members 
than the survey of professional forecasters. Even so, if one feeds the staff f
defined by equation (1), the resulting interest rate prescriptions do not match historical decisions by 
the Governing Council as well as in the case of the SPF forecasts.  One important reason may be the 
lack of staff forecasts of the horizon used in the rule that is the 4
recent data release.  While the staff forecasts must be generated in
the ECB only publishes the yearly numbers. Averaging year
close to the near-term quarterly forecasts, that is
 
Nevertheless, Figure 3 provides the projected interest rate path with the OW rule using the 
recent Eurosystem staff forecasts that were
relative to the MRO rate in the 3
rd quarter of each month because that is the date of the publication 
of the staff projections. It is directly apparent from the figure, that the rule with staff forecasts 
already have prescribed lower interest rates in the last three quarters and projects interest rates to 
stay lower for longer than with the SPF forecast. The detailed calculations are provided in the 
appendix. Given that the rule with staff forecasts 
as the rule with SPF forecasts we tend to discount the estimate of the ECB’s “extended period time” 
that is computed with the staff forecasts. 
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Figure 2: Projected Rate Path using the OW Rule 
The black line shows the ECB’s interest rate on its main refinancing operations in the second month of each 
gray dashed lines show the OW Rule: MRO rate = (previous MRO r
forecasted inflation deviation from target) + 0.5(2-quarter ahead forecasted GDP growth rate gap from 
an inflation target of 2.0 percent and the upper line a target of 1.5 percent. 
rate path implied by available inflation and output growth forecasts. The forecast data
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ate in the first quarter of 2014.  By the second quarter of 2014 the full range of 
projected interest rate prescriptions has risen above the current MRO rate of 50 basis points. As the 
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5. What about normative concerns? Should other interest rate benchmarks be given weight in the 
policy decision?  
 
While the OW rule with SPF forecasts matches historical ECB rate decisions 
need not necessarily conclude that its rate prescriptions are best or most effective in a normative 
sense. For example, Orphanides and Wieland (2013)
the euro area to evaluate which rules
fluctuations. It turns out that a rule of the form of equation (1) that is based on recent nowcasts of 
inflation and output growth performs more robustly in terms of stabilizing output and in
model uncertainty than the same rule with forecasts. 
uncertainty about which model provides the closest representation of the true macroeconomic 
dynamics in the euro area.  
 
Furthermore, there are other well-known benchmarks that could be used.  The well
rule (see Taylor 1993) has provided a useful signal ahead of the financial crisis by indicating that 
policy rates in the United States were too low for too long prior to 2007 (see Taylor 2007)
rule refers to the level of the policy rate and not only to the change of the policy rate as equation (1). 
An additional difference is that the Taylor rule includes nowcasts rather than fo
output gap, that is, the deviation between the level of actual output from potential, rather than the 
growth rate. Thus, it is defined as follows: 
 
  2 0.5( ) 0.5( )/ t t t t t t i Q Q Q π π π = + + − + −
 
where Q refers to the level of GDP rather than its growth rate.
Commission nowcasts to generate rate prescriptions from the original Taylor rule for the euro area. It 
would prescribe higher interest rates at the current juncture and in the future.
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Figure 3: Projected Rate Path using
The black line shows the ECB’s interest rate on its main refinancing operations in the third month of each quarter
gray dashed lines show the OW Rule: MRO rate = (previous MRO rate) + 0.5(
forecasted inflation deviation from target) + 0.5(2-quarter ahead forecasted GDP growth rate gap from potential). The 
an inflation target of 2.0 percent and the upper line a target of 1.5 percent. The blue lines show the 
projected rate path implied by available inflation and output growth forecasts. The forecast data is interpolated
What about normative concerns? Should other interest rate benchmarks be given weight in the 
While the OW rule with SPF forecasts matches historical ECB rate decisions surprisingly
need not necessarily conclude that its rate prescriptions are best or most effective in a normative 
phanides and Wieland (2013) use several empirical macroeconomic models of 
the euro area to evaluate which rules are most effective in terms of stabilizing output and inflation 
fluctuations. It turns out that a rule of the form of equation (1) that is based on recent nowcasts of 
inflation and output growth performs more robustly in terms of stabilizing output and in
the same rule with forecasts. Here, model uncertainty refers to the 
model provides the closest representation of the true macroeconomic 
known benchmarks that could be used.  The well-known Taylor 
rule (see Taylor 1993) has provided a useful signal ahead of the financial crisis by indicating that 
policy rates in the United States were too low for too long prior to 2007 (see Taylor 2007)
rule refers to the level of the policy rate and not only to the change of the policy rate as equation (1). 
An additional difference is that the Taylor rule includes nowcasts rather than forecasts and uses the 
between the level of actual output from potential, rather than the 
growth rate. Thus, it is defined as follows:  
* * * 2 0.5( ) 0.5( )/ t t t t t t i Q Q Q π π π = + + − + − , 
where Q refers to the level of GDP rather than its growth rate. Figure 4 uses Eurosystem staff and EU 
ssion nowcasts to generate rate prescriptions from the original Taylor rule for the euro area. It 
would prescribe higher interest rates at the current juncture and in the future. 
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Appendix 
 
This appendix presents the raw data collected from the SPF, ECB staff and EC AMECO and our 
calculations with it. It should always be kept in mind that the rule we use is a forecast-based rule. 
Hence, the inflation rate used to determine the interest rate in quarter t is the forecasted inflation 
rate for t+3, based on information in quarter t. Similarly, the growth rates of GDP and potential GDP 
are the forecasted values for t+2, based on information in quarter t. For the historical values in 
figures 1 to 4, real time data has been employed throughout. The calculation of the projected future 
forecasts based on the latest information available is illustrated for the growth rate of potential GDP 
in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Raw data and calculation of potential GDP growth rates 
Potential 
Growth 
2013  2014 
0.351  0.477 
   Calculation 
Potential 
Growth(+2) 
2013:Q2   =1.00(2013) + 0.00(2014)  0.351 
2013:Q3   =0.75(2013) + 0.25(2014)  0.382 
2013:Q4   =0.50(2013) + 0.50(2014)  0.414 
2014:Q1   =0.25(2013) + 0.75(2014)  0.446 
2014:Q2   =0.00(2013) + 1.00(2014)  0.477 
Note:   The two raw data figures are taken from the EC AMECO publication on May 3, 2013. 
 
Furthermore, the SPF contains two inflation forecasts from the most recent data release, which 
correspond to the third and the seventh quarter ahead from the current quarter. The published GDP 
growth rates are a two-quarter and a four-quarter-ahead forecast. Since the final SPF data point is 
given by 2013:Q3, future inflation and growth forecasts are calculated as in table 1. The forecasts and 
resulting OW rule prescriptions, which are also visible in figure 2, are shown in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Raw data and calculation of the forecast-based OW Rule with SPF forecasts 
   Raw SPF 
Data from 
2013:Q3 
Inflation Rate  GDP Growth Rate    
   2014:Q2  1.50  2014:Q1  0.60    
   2015:Q2  1.70  2015:Q1  1.20    
Quarter 
MRO 
Rate(-1) 
Inflation(+3)  Growth(+2) 
Potential 
Growth(+2) 
OW Rule 
(Target 2.0) 
OW Rule 
(Target 1.5) 
2013:Q3  0.50  1.50  0.60  0.38  0.36  0.61 
2013:Q4  0.50  1.55  0.75  0.41  0.44  0.69 
2014:Q1  0.50  1.60  0.90  0.45  0.53  0.78 
2014:Q2  0.50  1.65  1.05  0.48  0.61  0.86 
2014:Q3  0.50  1.70  1.20  0.51  0.70  0.95 
Note:  The four raw data figures are taken from the ECB SPF 2013:Q3 publication. The OW Rules are calculated as: 
MRO rate(-1) + 0.5[Inflation(+3) - Target] + 0.5[Growth(+2) - Potential Growth(+2)]. The Potential Growth(+2) number in 
2014:Q3 is extrapolated by assuming the same change as between the two preceding observations. 
 
Finally, figure 3 is constructed the same way as figure 2 just with ECB staff data. These are not only 
published one month later in each quarter (hence, the benchmark MRO rate and the relevant real-
time numbers of potential output might differ) but the growth rates always refer to years instead of 
quarters. Hence, the most current numbers belong to 2013:Q2. Nonetheless, we already use the  
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knowledge that the MRO rate has been cut from 0.75 to 0.50 percent for the forecasts. Table 3 
contains all the resulting information. 
 
Table 3: Raw data and calculation of the forecast-based OW Rule with staff forecasts 
   Raw Staff 
Data from 
2013:Q2 
Inflation Rate  GDP Growth Rate    
   2013  1.40  2013  -0.60    
   2014  1.30  2014  1.10    
Quarter 
MRO  
Rate(-1) 
Inflation(+3)  Growth(+2) 
Potential 
Growth(+2) 
OW Rule 
(Target 2.0) 
OW Rule 
(Target 1.5) 
2013:Q2  0.75  1.38  -0.60  0.35  -0.04  0.21 
2013:Q3  0.50  1.35  -0.18  0.38  -0.10  0.15 
2013:Q4  0.50  1.33  0.25  0.41  0.08  0.33 
2014:Q1  0.50  1.30  0.68  0.45  0.26  0.51 
2014:Q2  0.50  1.28  1.10  0.48  0.45  0.70 
Note:  The four raw data figures are taken from the ECB staff June 2013 publication. The OW Rules are calculated as: 
MRO rate(-1) + 0.5[Inflation(+3) - Target] + 0.5[Growth(+2) - Potential Growth(+2)]. The Inflation(+3) number in 2014:Q2 is 
extrapolated by assuming the same change as between the two preceding observations. 
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